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ABSTRACT
Thinking in terms of supply chains, a crux with a view to antitrust damages is
the fact that calculations (of market participants and hence also within legal
proceedings) do not stop at the bilateral trader relation but go beyond this
two-sided interaction. More often than not victims of antitrust violations
pass-on part or all of the harm, to the next level in the supply chain.
Under certain conditions this is beneficial for the victim and has to be
subtracted from the original amount of damage. Legal benchmarks apply
and economics knowledge is of the essence. Focussing on damage
stemming from a cartel agreement this paper will first sketch the economic
conditions for passing-on. Next, a comparative analysis of recent
jurisprudence on passing-on in three jurisdictions (Germany, the
Netherlands and Spain) is carried out. It can overall be shown that to
successfully tackle cartel cases involving passing-on the potential of an
interdisciplinary approach between law and economics needs to be
exploited far more than it is currently done.
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1. Introduction
Taking a cartel agreement as an exemplary case of an antitrust violation,
from a purchaser’s point of view (who is not the final consumer) the inter-
play between three main damage components is legally relevant and econ-
omically founded: the overcharge he or she paid because the cartel is seeking
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to optimize its profit and, therefore, increases prices,1 the pass-on rate if he
or she transferred part or all of this overcharge to the next level of the supply
chain and a volume effect – because at higher prices the own purchasers buy
less which regularly results in some lost profit. Expressed in terms of the
main goal of the European Antitrust Damages Directive (the Directive)
and, hence, the European Member States (MS) antitrust damages
regimes, namely full compensation,2 this dynamic leads to the following
total damage calculation per purchaser as stressed by the Guidelines 2019
drafted by the European Commission:3 “overcharge”− “pass-on”
+ “volume effect”. Being true to the goal of full compensation MS
damages regimes are to avoid both over- same as under-compensation.4
Any victim is to be put in the situation he or she would have been in but
for the infringement. To account for damage that is passed on along the
supply chain the so-called passing-on defence needs to be fine-tuned. To
do so in the appropriate circumstances the interaction between economic
insights and the law needs to be optimized. Only in the interplay between
law and economics can the conditions under which the benefit derived
from passing on damage is to be subtracted from the original amount be
successfully determined. Economic insights teach us not only when it is
likely that a pass-on occurs but also that it might be accompanied by
additional negative consequences for the purchasers – mainly volume
effects. Thus, the enforcement response must take these into consideration,
too. The focus of this paper lies upon pass-on as such rather than the
accompanying volume effect.
Focussing on damage stemming from a cartel agreement this paper will
first sketch the economic conditions for pass-on. Next, a comparative
1Other measures to the same ultimate effect are possible, too – eg agreements on quantities, distribution
of customers etc. This paper deals with the effect of so-called hardcore cartels that are shown to con-
siderably disturb competition in markets and focuses on a price cartel for illustrative purposes.
2Recital 3 ff. and Art. 1 (1) 1st sentence & Art. 3 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national laws for
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union [2014]
OJ L349/1; Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules gov-
erning actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of
the Member States and of the European Union, COM(2013) 404, 11.6.2013 (Proposal for a Directive), 13;
the cartel damages regimes in the European Member States are geared towards this goal already before
the implementation of the Directive, see BJ Rodger, M Sousa Ferro and F Marcos, ‘A Panacea for Com-
petition Law Damages Actions in the EU? A Comparative View of the Implementation of the EU Antitrust
Damages Directive in Sixteen Member States’ (2019) 1 Maastricht Journal 18.
3Communication from the Commission, Guidelines for national courts on how to estimate the share of
overcharge which was passed on to the indirect purchaser, 2019 (Commission, Guidelines 2019), 18;
see also RBB Economics/Cuatrecasas Gonçalves Pereira (2016) “Study on the Passing-on of Overcharges”,
European Commission (Pass-on Study 2016); see also R Noble and R Lauer, ‘Pass-on and Volume Effects
in Private Damages Actions: An Economic Perspective’ (2018) 4 Competition Law & Policy Debate 30, 36.
4The Directive makes this very clear in its Art. 12 (2).
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analysis of pertinent jurisprudence on pass-on in three jurisdictions
(Germany, the Netherlands and Spain) is carried out. A focus will be
put on the follow-on damage claims raised in relation to the truck
cartel.5 Pass-on is in general increasingly raised by defendants (and also
by claimants).6 The developments in the MS are not unaffected by Euro-
pean legislation, in particular the provisions in the rather recent Directive.
Whereas the current cases are dealt with according to laws dating back
from before the implementation phase (even if some judgements
mention the Directive), future cases will more and more be subject to
revised regimes. Therefore, as a final part this paper looks briefly at the
changes the implementation of the Directive will bring about for compar-
able cases.
2. Economics of pass-on
There is a sound economic relationship between an overcharge that pur-
chasers need to pay for their input factor or a product they will resell and
pass-on.7 Any purchaser pursues profit maximization.8 This is true in the
light of any price increase and, hence, clearly also if this price increase is
the consequence of a violation of competition law.9 It can generally be
expected that a company considers a cost increase in its calculations.10
The purpose of this decision is to compensate for losses in its profit
margin.11 In as much as there is little doubt on the general existence of
pass-on, there is, however, no such thing as a typical pass-on rate.12
The possibilities of pass-on are in particular unrelated to the level at
5European Commission, Summary decision of 19 July 2016, AT.39824 – Trucks.
6J-F Laborde, ‘Cartel Damages Actions in Europe: How Courts Have Assessed Cartel Overcharges (2018 ed.)’
(2019) 1(1) Concurrences 8; think of an indirect purchaser that is, of course, not directly affected by the
overcharge but by the passing-on of such an overcharge. The use of passing-on as a “sword” is beyond
the scope of this paper. It is obviously true that the amount that is passed on is the same no matter
which side you consider it from – from the purchaser or seller perspective.
7See for more details RBB Economics (2014), “Cost pass-through: theory, measurement, and potential
policy implications”, a report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading (RBB Economics 2014 report), 17,
starting on 122 also re empirical research; Commission, Guidelines 2019; see also FW Bulst, Schadenser-
satzansprüche der Marktgegenseite im Kartellrecht (Baden-Baden 2006) 281.
8B Durand and I Williams, ‘The Importance of Accounting for Passing-on When Calculating Damages that
Result from Infringements of Competition Law’ (2017) 79 ERA Forum 81.
9R Inderst and S Thomas, Schadensersatz bei Kartellverstößen. Juristische und ökonomische Grundlagen und
Methoden (2nd edn 2018) 296.
10ibid 296; Bulst (n 7) 286; U Schwalbe, ‘Lucrum Cessans und Schäden durch Kartelle bei Zulieferern, Her-
stellern von Komplementärgütern sowie weiteren Parteien’ (2017) 157 NZKart 159; RG Harris and LA Sul-
livan, ‘Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis’ (1979) 269 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 276: “passing on of overcharges is not the exception: it is the rule. […]”.
11Durand and Williams (n 8) 85: “Whereas the overcharge reduces the profit margin earned per unit of
output sold, the effect of passing-on is to increase that profit margin”.
12European Commission, Practical Guidelines 2013, 50.
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which a purchaser is located in a supply chain. It has to be assessed for
each level individually. There are a number of decisive factors that deter-
mine the pass-on rate, however.13 A pass-on decision is taken in the light
of the demand curve whose price elasticity will determine how many cus-
tomers will refrain from buying as a consequence of pass-on.14 The follow-
ing criteria that in the end all affect the demand curve are relevant:15 If all
purchasers on a market are affected by the cartel price, then the intensity
of competition seems to be the most relevant criterion for the pass-on pos-
sibilities.16 In a competitive market with prices being equal to marginal
costs, pass-on can even be expected to be full – at 100%.17 This is an
extreme case that is often labelled “perfect competition” to simplify.18
The result is intuitive because if the market price equals the marginal
costs, all the companies (that all paid the cartelized price) have to increase
their own prices because they have to earn at least their marginal costs to
stay on the market. In reality there will be no such thing as “perfect com-
petition” in markets. The other extreme case is the monopoly situation. A
monopolist maximizes profits – hence also in the light of having bought a
cartelized product.19 In this exercise a monopolist will not necessarily
pass-on the whole overcharge.20 It could be shown that in a simplified
scenario the monopolist will always pass on 50% of the overcharge.21
13MA Han, MP Schinkel and J Tuinstra, ‘The Overcharge as a Measure for Antitrust Damages’ [2008–08]
Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper Series 18: There is, furthermore, no simple cal-
culation method.
14European Commission, Practical Guidelines 2013, 51; J Haucap and T Stühmeier, ‘Wie hoch sind durch
Kartelle verursachte Schäden: Antworten aus Sicht der Wirtschaftstheorie’ (2008) 413 Wirtschaft und
Wettbewerb 421; Schwalbe (n 10) 159; Inderst and Thomas (n 10) 303.
15The criteria mentioned in European Commission, Study on the Passing-on of Overcharges, 2016 are in
essence congruent with ibid 298; Durand and Williams (n 8) 82 summarizes: “how widely firms are
affected, the nature and intensity of competition on the relevant downstream market, the type of
cost affected and the relationship between price and quantities demanded and supplied”.
16Schwalbe (n 10) 159; Haucap and Stühmeier (n 14) 421; Inderst and Thomas (n 9) 298; European Com-
mission, Practical Guidelines 2013, 51.
17Inderst and Thomas (n 9) 298; Van der Veer, Jan Peter and A Lofaro, ‘Estimating Pass-on’ (2010) 2 The CPI
Antitrust Journal 3; Noble and Lauer (n 3) 32 for a short summary of the main relations; B Neurohr, ‘A
Tractable Cost Pass-Through Benchmark’ (2016) 36 Economics Bulletin 1603; in that vein already Harris
and Sullivan (n 10) 279, 283; R Cotterill, L Egan and W Buckhold, ‘Beyond Illinois Brick: The Law and Econ-
omics of Cost Pass-Through in the ADM Price Fixing Case’ (2001) 18 Review of Industrial Organization 45,
50; Commission, Guidelines 2019, 15.
18This is a market scenario based on a number of strong assumptions. Some economic contributions are
more precise and argue based upon a market with Betrand competition (again resting upon a number of
presumptions) where competitors compete heavily with the result that they also produce at marginal
costs, see about this Martin Hellwig, ‘Private Damage Claims and the Passing-on Defense in Horizontal
Price Fixing caes: An Conomist’s Erspective’ in J Basedow (ed), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law
(Alphen aan den Rijn 2007) 128. For the purpose at hand it is crucial that producers only earn their mar-
ginal costs. To simplify further assume that such costs are constant for every unit.
19European Commission, Practical Guidelines 2013, 51.
20Van der Veer, Jan Peter, and Lofaro (n 17) 3; Inderst and Thomas (n 9) 441.
21For the assumptions, see Hellwig (n 18), Inderst and Thomas (n 9), 299, 603; Noble and Lauer (n 3) 32.
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The results for oligopolies lie in between.22 The pass-on rates, hence, reg-
ularly range from 50% to 100%.23 These are as said the more realistic cases.
One can tentatively say that the pass-on rate increases with the intensity of
competition.24 Market coverage of the cartel can be varied.25 This factor
determines in how far all purchasers on the after market are affected by
the cartelized price.26 The higher the market coverage, the more likely it
is that a purchaser passes on damage.27 The Oxera-study differentiates
between “firm-specific” and “industry-wide” overcharges in this
context.28 With the latter pass-on is more likely ceteris paribus. If the
market is, furthermore, competitive, there as said can be a full pass-
on.29 If only one company is affected on a competitive market, pass-on
is expected to be zero.30 Its competitors limit the possibilities of pass-
on.31 Purchasers would buy from them instead. Further parameters are
the following: Fixed price calculation mechanisms in an industry can
prevent pass-on in the short term.32 Long term contracts might inhibit
pass-on.33 The same is true for strategic interactions between competi-
tors.34 The duration of the infringement is a decisive factor,35 same as
the frequency of transactions.36 There might be a purchaser that has
market power.37 The type of cost that the overcharge affects might have
an effect, too – meaning fixed or variable costs. Likewise it will affect
the pass-on options if the cartelized input factor accounts only for a
22Van der Veer, Jan Peter, and Lofaro (n 17) 3.
23Pass-on Study 2016, 48.
24Inderst and Thomas (n 9) 299.
25Commission, Guidelines 2019, 41; R Inderst and S Thomas, ‘Pass-on bei entgeltlicher Nutzungsüberlas-
sung auf nachgelagerten Märkten’ (2018) 158 NZKart 244; Inderst and Thomas (n 9) 302.
26European Commission, Practical Guidelines 2013, 50.
27; Pass-on Study 2016, iii, 31; European Commission, Practical Guidelines 2013, 51.
28Oxera, ‘Quantifying Antitrust Damages – Towards non-Binding Guidance for Courts’ (Oxera report 2009)
x, 117; Durand and Williams (n 8) 82.
29Pass-on Study 2016, iii; Haucap and Stühmeier (n 14) 421; Noble and Lauer (n 3) 33: “the level of pass-on
and the degree of competition are likely to be positively correlated if an infringement affects competi-
tors alike”; Oxera report 2009, 117; European Commission, Practical Guidelines 2013, 51; note Durand and
Williams (n 8) 82: “More precisely, this assumes that the unit costs of supply do not vary with the overall
volume supplied. More generally, the extent of passing-on of industry-wide overcharges in the textbook
perfectly competitive environment is predicted to depend on the relative price sensitivities (elasticities)
of supply and demand, and can be less than 100%”.
30Oxera report 2009, x; European Commission, Practical Guidelines 2013, 50; regarding a less extreme case
Van der Veer, Jan Peter, and Lofaro (n 17) 3; Durand and Williams (n 8) 81.
31Van der Veer, Jan Peter, and Lofaro (n 17) 3: “pass on can be expected to be small”.
32Oxera report 2009, 121; Commission, Guidelines 2019, 14.
33Inderst and Thomas (n 25) 160.
34Durand and Williams (n 8) 82; Inderst and Thomas (n 9) 301. More and more research is available regard-
ing so-called umbrella effects. It might be that competitors do not reap off the costumers but increase
their prices, too, under the umbrella of the cartel.
35Inderst and Thomas (n 9) 309; Durand and Williams (n 8) 82.
36European Commission, Practical Guidelines 2013, 51.
37Oxera report 2009, 121; Pass-on Study 2016, iv.
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small portion of the total costs.38 The type of good has an effect.39 Last but
not least an important factor for the profitability of pass-on is the volume
effect. A price increase leads to a reduction in demand as determined by
the demand curve. This reduction in demand under normal circumstances
means some lost profits.40 The pass-on decision ultimately determines the
volume effect that a purchaser can expect.41 Typically pass-on and volume
effect are illustrated as two separate damage components. The volume
effect can be calculated by multiplying the experienced reduction in
sales with the profit margin that the company would have had per unit
in the situation but for the infringement. Where there is pass-on, there
is typically a volume effect.42 The volume effect can, furthermore, be of
a considerable amount.43 Again the precise quantification depends on a
large number of factors and is regarded as a major challenge from an econ-
omic point of view.44 However, it does not take away that its general exist-
ence is well founded. Back to looking at pass-on in isolation: Pass-on is
overall very heterogeneous.45 Apart from 50% to100% range, there can
be cases where pass-on is below 50%. Strong indicators would be low
market coverage and a highly competitive market. The pass-on effect
can also be higher than 100%.46 There is some empirical research which
confirms the variability of the pass-on rate.47 It was, for instance,
38Inderst and Thomas (n 9) 307.
39Inderst and Thomas (n 25) 159.
40In essence only under the extreme scenario that the price elasticity of demand was perfect there would
be no lost profit or under the extreme scenario in which producers were selling at marginal costs which
the cartelized input factor would become a part of there is no lost profit because producers did not have
a profit margin in the “but-for-scenario” to start with, see for details Inderst and Thomas (n 9) 441.
41European Commission, Practical Guidelines 2013, 52; ibid 439; Oxera, comments on 2011 draft guidance,
4. It is acknowledged that the decision of the cartelists and the volume effect they expect because of the
price agreement is a very decisive factor here.
42Inderst and Thomas (n 9) 453, 454; Pass-on Study 2016, 50; Pass-on Study 2016, 196: “When a claimant
passes on part or all of an overcharge, it will almost invariably lose sales volumes and will suffer harm in
the form of the lost profit margins that would have been earned on those sales”; Van der Veer, Jan Peter,
and Lofaro (n 17) 4: “Again, economic theory offers some useful insights into the likely magnitude of the
output effect under different scenarios”, European Commission, Practical Guidelines 2013, 49; Durand
and Williams (n 8) 86: “If a firm increases its prices, then the volume of its sales will fall compared to
the scenario in which those prices are unchanged. Passing-on will therefore result in the loss of the
profit that would have been earned on those lost sales volumes”; Schwalbe (n 10) 157; Inderst and
Thomas (n 9) 452.
43Schwalbe (n 10) 158; Van der Veer, Jan Peter, and Lofaro (n 17) 4: “[…]in a downstream market charac-
terized by imperfect competition, the output effect can be very significant”.
44Inderst and Thomas (n 9) 456.
45ibid 297; Noble and Lauer (n 3) 35.
46Durand and Williams (n 8) 85; RBB Economics 2014 report, 26; Pass-on Study 2016, 181 in the footnote:
“In general, pass-on need not be ‘all-or-nothing’. Economics suggests that pass-on can range from 0% to
100% and, in theory, can even be greater than 100%”; Commission, Guidelines 2019, 36. These cases
seem to present a particular challenge to legal dogmatics.
47RBB Economics 2014 report, 17, 122; see also Frank Maier-Rigaud, C.-Philipp Heller and Philip Hanspach,
‘Zur Weiterwälzung von Preisaufschlägen’ (2019) 11 WuW 561–68, 561.
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confirmed that the industry-wide pass-on is indeed higher than the firm-
specific one.48 Also a pass-on of more than 100% was found.49 Again it
holds true that the variability does not take away the fact that the existence
as such is very certain from an economic point of view. The legal system
can, hence, not avoid dealing with pass-on and consequently volume
effects, that are as shown heavily interlinked, in the quest for coming as
close as possible to the goal of full compensation.
3. Legal treatment of pass-on
Various European MS have accepted the challenge of dealing with pass-on
in antitrust cases. The jurisprudence is mainly rather recent and shall be
elaborated upon in the following:
3.1. Germany
3.1.1. General approach
In the German legal system pass-on is treated as a matter of “Vorteilsaus-
gleichung” (adjustment of profits) and, hence, requires consideration once
the damage that occurred has been determined.50 So the amount that was
passed on does not reduce the original damage amount in the sense that
this damage is regarded as never having occurred in the first place. This
also means that the overcharge can be claimed separately without any
need from the claimants’ side to refer to pass-on.51 The concept of “Vor-
teilsausgleichung” reflects the prohibition of unjust enrichment. A victim
that passed on damage may not profit from this behaviour. The burden of
proof for this action, however, rests upon the defendant.52 “Vorteilsausgle-
ichung” becomes relevant when one event, one infringement, leads to both
positive and negative effects.53 In order for the positive effect to be
48RBB Economics 2014 report, 26: “There is, however, no clear evidence about the difference in magnitude
between industry-wide and firm-specific cost pass-through […]”.
49RBB Economics 2014 report, 126; Noble and Lauer (n 4) 35.
50See para 33c (1) 1 GWB (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – Law against Restraint of Compe-
tition); for details BGH judgment of 28.6.2011, KZR 75/10; Immenga/Mestmäcker/Emmerich, 5. ed. 2014,
GWB § 33, para 61; A. S. Steinhardt, Die Verwirklichung des Effektivitätsgrundsatzes im Rahmen von pri-
vaten kartellrechtlichen Schadensersatzansprüchen im internationalen und europäischen Kontext (Berlin,
2018) 86; Bornkamm/Tolkmitt § 33c GWB in Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht Kommentar, Band 1 – Deutsches
Kartellrecht, 13. ed., 2018, Luchterhand Verlag, para 15; J-U Franck, Marktordnung durch Haftung (Tübin-
gen 2016) 557; Inderst and Thomas (n 9) 350.
51S Thomas, ‘Schadensverteilung im Rahmen von Vertriebsketten bei Verstoß gegen europäisches und
deutsches Kartellrecht’ (2016) 180 ZHR 45, 48.
52Instead of all BGH judgment of 17.10.2003 – V ZR 84/02, NJW-RR 2004, 79, para 17.
53MüKoBGB/Oetker, 8. ed. 2019, BGB § 249, para 231.
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deductible, there has to be a causal link between this benefit and the infrin-
gement. The theory of adequate causation is pertinent.54 Secondly, it can
only be accounted for the benefit if this is in line with the purpose of the
compensation rule, this means that the deduction may neither unduly
burden the claimant nor unreasonably favour the defendant.55 The
most pronounced judgement regarding the operation of pass-on in com-
petition law is the so-called “ORWI”-judgment – a follow-on litigation
related to the carbonless paper cartel.56 The Supreme Court Bundesger-
ichtshof (BGH) confirms also for competition cases that the burden of
proof of showing the benefit (here in the form of pass-on) rests with
the defendant. The defendant has to make this plausible with reference
to the general market conditions on the after market, in particular with
reference to the price elasticity of demand, the price development and
the product characteristics.57 The BGH furthermore restricts the scope
of the passing-on defence by making it particularly hard for the defendant
to invoke it. The judges to that effect ruled specifically on the role of the
volume effect: A defendant that would invoke a passing-on defence had
to establish that passing on the overcharge did not result in any detriment
to the purchaser, in particular a reduction in demand.58 The non-existence
of the volume effect according to the BGH is an element of “Vorteilsaus-
gleichung” that the defendant needs to show.59 Additionally, only under
very narrow circumstances would German law require a so-called “sekun-
däre Darlegungslast” from the victim, i.e. an obligation for the victim to
disclose information whenever the burden of proof is actually with the
other side but the information can – simply put – for good reasons not
be provided by the party in charge. In very limited cases the victim
would, hence, need to aid in proving the damage. In terms of procedure
this must mean that any volume effect would need to be calculated
against the amount that was passed on and only the remaining sum
could then be subtracted from the overcharge amount. In practice no pro-
cedure until today has ever actually followed all these steps. The BGH also
acknowledges that a price increase on the after market might be due to
factors other than a cartel, e.g. the particular businessman’s capabilities
54Bulst (n 7) 124 ff; not all agree with that, see MüKoBGB/Oetker, 8. ed. 2019, BGB § 249, para 246 with
further references.
55Settled case-law, instead of all BGH judgment of 16.5.1980 – V ZR 91/79, BGHZ 77, 151, para 16.
56BGH judgment of 28.6.2011, KZR 75/10, BGHZ 190, 145.
57BGH judgment of 28.6.2011, KZR 75/10, BGHZ 190, 145, para 69.
58This contribution will not deal further with this damage component or with other potential negative
consequences.
59Appreciative of this outcome Thomas (n 51) 67; Inderst and Thomas (n 9) 361.
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or pre-existing price-setting ranges.60 Showing a mere price increase on a
cartel’s after market is, therefore, not sufficient for the proof of causation.
Factors that help to determine that there was pass-on are the price elas-
ticity of offer and demand, the duration of the infringement and the inten-
sity of competition. These factors partially overlap with the first “list” that
the court gives (as said “price elasticity of demand, the price development
and the product characteristics”). Both sets of factors taken together
encompass some of the main economic parameters that were set out
above.61 Also, the BGH’s lists do not seem to be closed lists. The court
specifically refers to the case in which most purchasers are affected by
the cartel – thus the wide coverage scenario – and the situation that
their customers have no or only few possibilities of avoiding them.62
This “and” construction seems a bit redundant from my point of view.
In such a scenario, the court sets out that the causal link between the
cartel and pass-on can generally be given if there was “workable compe-
tition on the after market” (wenn der Wettbewerb auf dem Anschlussmarkt
ansonsten funktionsfähig war). Above it was indeed outlined how wide
cartel coverage and intense competition are strong indicators for a high
pass-on rate. Note that German law knows a general competence for
courts to estimate damage if the exact quantification is disproportionately
difficult63 under the condition that the necessary leads are given to the
court (according to § 287 [1] of the German Civil Procedural Code – Zivil-
prozessordnung [ZPO]). This competence is also applicable in the context
of pass-on. Overall the BGH, hence, clearly referred to some of the econ-
omic criteria that determine the success of pass-on. It likewise shows
awareness of the potential existence of detrimental volume effects. It, fur-
thermore, highlights a scenario that comes close to the exemplary case
outlined above in which the scope of the overcharge is “industry-wide”
and the after market is a competitive market – conditions favourable to
pass-on.
3.1.2. Recent case-law
Lower German courts have recently refused to accept the passing-on
defence in a number of different cases and for a variety of reasons. One
focus was laid on the question whether the after market was actually a
60BGH judgment of 28.6.2011, KZR 75/10, BGHZ 190, 145, paras 46 with further references.
61Thomas (n 51) 55.
62BGH judgment of 28.6.2011, KZR 75/10, BGHZ 190, 145, para 47.
63OLG Düsseldorf judgment of 14.5.2008 – VI-U (Kart) 14/07, WuW/E DE-R 2311, para 45: “soweit deren
exakte Ermittlung unverhältnismäßig schwierig ist”.
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competitive one, referring back to the BGH judgment.64 The LG (Landger-
icht – District court) Berlin argued like this, for instance, in the context of
the lift cartel when stating that the subsequent lease of a subway station
would not fulfil this criterion.65 The court argues that there is no compe-
tition, neither on the supplier nor on the consumer side. The court, then
goes on to acknowledging, however, that such a non-existence of a market
(in its definition) does not exclude the occurrence of pass-on. Other courts
followed a similar reasoning. LG Dortmund does in follow-on litigation in
the context of the German railway cartel not regard the subsequent sale of
tickets for tram and subway as a market activity.66 It is acknowledged also
by this court that the non-existence of a market (as they define it) as such
does not exclude pass-on. This approach has been criticized from a legal
and an economic point of view.67 It is argued that the ORWI-judgment is
interpreted too narrowly by the German lower courts if they argue that the
non-existence of a competitive after market excludes pass-on as such.68
Indeed in the ORWI-judgment referred to above this market situation
is also to my understanding presented as an exemplary case which com-
bines conditions that are favourable to pass-on. This specific passage of
the judgment is partly also interpreted as a statement of prima facie evi-
dence.69 However, the BGH does thereby not pronounce itself about the
monopoly situation or other market conditions under which competition
is severely limited. It does not exclude that pass-on could occur under
those market conditions as well. The economic insights presented above
illustrated that pass-on can also go hand in hand with market power.70
Indeed, some of the courts immediately recognize this, however, do not
elaborate upon other market conditions in depth because pass-on falls
through in their view for another reason. As a side-note, the apparent
uneasiness of the courts to accept pass-on in regulated markets as
such is not justified from an economic point of view either.71
64Roth in: Jaeger/Kokott/Pohlmann/Schroeder, Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, 93. Lieferung
04.2019, § 33c GWB, para 30 refers to come courts that do it correctly and others that misinterpret
the BGH ruling in his view; this reasoning can be traced back to BGH judgment of 28.6.2011, KZR 75/
10, BGHZ 190, 145, para 47.
65LG Berlin judgment of 6.8.2013–16 O 193/11 Kart, NZKart 2014, 37, para 60.
66LG Dortmund judgment of 21.12.2016 – 8 O 93/14 Kart, juris, paras 128.
67Monopolkommission (2018), XXII. Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommission gemäß § 44 Abs. 1 Satz 1
GWB (Monopolkommission Hauptgutachten 2018) 310.
68ibid 314: “Das Vorliegen eines wettbewerblich geprägten Anschlussmarktes muss im Rahmen der
Prüfung somit vielmehr als verstärkender Faktor und nicht als notwendige Bedingung verstanden
werden”.
69ibid 55: The BGH seems to work with the tool of a prima facie evidence for the benefit of the indirect
purchasers.
70See also Maier-Rigaud and others (n 47) 563.
71See Maier-Rigaud and others (n 47) 561.
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A second set of reasoning concerns the missing reflection in prices, the
lack of adequate causation. The mentioned judgments go quite in depth
about the price calculation mechanisms, thereby seeming to present econ-
omic arguments. The LG Berlin elaborates why it saw no immediate
relation between the overcharge and the rent paid for the subway
station by the lessee by referring among others to a large number of
factors that such a price reflects and also the fact that such contracts are
concluded on a long-term basis.72 The court, therefore, excludes the
potential causal link of the cartel overcharge with the ticket price paid
by the subway passengers. The LG Dortmund argues similarly with a
view to the sale of tickets for tram and subway.73 On appeal the OLG
(Oberlandesgericht – Higher Court) Düsseldorf, furthermore, focuses on
the fact that the defendant had not sufficiently shown that the claimant
worked in a cost-covering way to start with which it regarded as a necess-
ary precondition for a successful pass-on.74 The judgments are criticized
for too narrowly interpreting the BGH’s judgment in terms of the required
causal link.75 From an economic point of view pass-on can be done in the
context of quite a number of business activities. A lot of pass-on is possible
independently of which type of costs were affected and how prices were
calculated. Hence, from an economic point of view the courts operate
too harshly. The LG Hannover is the first court to decide a case regarding
the truck cartel. Again, in line with the reasonings just set out, it is quick to
rule out a competitive after market when it comes to the communal waste
disposal business and the public cleansing service.76 This court does – at
least not explicitly – state its awareness of the fact that competition on the
after market is not a necessary condition for pass-on. The LG Dortmund
excludes pass-on in the context of the truck cartel in the light of a suing
transport company for yet another reason. It argued that even if the
business of transportation could be classified as a market activity, there
was a lack of congruency between the two markets.77 It distinguished
the cartelized product and the activity that was carried out on the after
market. With reference to the ORWI-judgment it argued that pass-on
can only apply to cases of selling or further processing of the cartelized
72LG Berlin judgment of 6.8.2013–16 O 193/11 Kart, NZKart 2014, 37, para 60. Therefore, ultimately there is
no reason to allow for the passing-on defense even if the non-existence of a market (in the definition of
the court) does not exclude pass-on.
73LG Dortmund judgment of 21.12.2016, 8 O 90/14 (Kart), WuW 2017, 98, para 132.
74OLG Düsseldorf judgment of 22.8.2018 – VI-U (Kart) 1/17, juris, para 145; criticized by Maier-Rigaud and
others (n 47).
75Monopolkommission Hauptgutachten 2018, 310.
76LG Hannover judgment of 18.12.2017–18 O 8/17, WuW 2018, 101, para 99.
77LG Dortmund judgment of 27.6.2018–8 O 13/17, BeckRS 2018, 13951, paras 111 with further references.
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product. From an economic point of view this cannot be backed up. Based
upon this reasoning the court also denied the defendants’ disclosure
request regarding any pass-on activity.
A last set of arguments concerns the value judgment in the context of
“Vorteilsausgleichung” – the question of whether the passing-on defence
can be denied because it goes against the purpose of the compensation
claim in question. More concretely courts have referred to the danger of
“rational apathy” with the lower supply chain levels to deny the passing-
on defence.78 They saw a conflict of objectives in terms of the wrong-
doer walking free and the unjust enrichment of the purchaser is to be
solved in favour of the victim.79 This is a legal argument. One might
generally argue that the economic arguments should mainly be con-
cerned with the question if pass-on in fact occurred whereas for the
question whether the defense should actually be granted other argu-
ments might come into play. Economic knowledge is of the essence
to determine the whereabouts of damage in interlinked markets. As
usual, it is about trade-offs, finding the right balance. It is the law’s
role to make a normative judgment based on scientific, economic evi-
dence on the facts.
3.2. The Netherlands
3.2.1. General approach
Pass-on is generally regarded to fit well within the Dutch damages law
and its ambition to put the claimant in the position as if the infringe-
ment never happened.80 There are two options to consider it – either
in the context of Art. 6:95 BW and following (Burgerlijk Wetboek –
Dutch Civil Code) under the general definition of damage that deserves
to be compensated or in the context of “voordeelstoerekening” – the
Dutch variant of adjustment of profits (Art. 6:100 BW).81 In the
78LG Dortmund judgment of 27.6.2018–8 O 13/17, BeckRS 2018, 13951, paras 122; LG Frankfurt am Main
judgment of 30.3.2016, 2 06 O 464/14, juris, para 160; OLG München judgment of 8.3.2018 – U 3497/16
Kart, NZKart 2018, 230, para 87, similarly LG Stuttgart judgment of 30.4.2018–45 O 1/17, juris, para 64;
BGH judgment of 28.6.2011 – KZR 75/10, BGHZ 190, 145, para 75; LG Kiel judgment of 18.4.2019 − 6 O
108/18, NZKart 2019, 435.
79LG Kiel judgment of 18.4.2019 − 6 O 108/18, NZKart 2019, 435.
80Asser/Sieburgh 6-II 2017/31; BJ Drijber, ‘Privaatrechtelijke handhaving van het mededingingsrecht:
nieuwe rechtspraak en nieuwe wetgeving’ (2016) 124 Ondernemingsrecht 620, 625.
81Ton Hartlief, ‘Schadevergoedingsrecht’ in T Hartlief, AL Keirse, SD Lindenbergh and RD Vriesendorp (eds),
Verbintenissen uit de wet en schadevergoeding (8th edn 2018), 255, 303; IN Tzankova, MJ Plomp and T
Raats, ‘Handhaven en balanceren: een tussenstand van privaatrechtelijke handhaving in Europa’
[2013] Markt & Mededinging 178, 183; for a summary of both options, see AL Keirse and M van Koge-
lenberg, ‘Schadebegroting bij een doorberekeningsverweer en een bijgestelde maatstaf voor voordeel-
stoerekening’ [2016] Contracteren 97, 102.
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context of Art. 6:100 BW damage and benefit have to result from the
same event (“eenzelfde gebeurtenis”). There has to be causation in the
sense of the conditio sine qua non-formula between the infringement
and the resulting benefit.82 It is noteworthy that the Dutch Supreme
Court Hoge Raad (HR) rather recently argued actually specifically in a
competition law case that there is in essence no difference between
both variants.83 The amount that was passed on both times has to be
subtracted if this is “redelijk” (equitable) according to Art 6:98 BW
now – that is the equity test that generally applies once the conditio
sine qua non formula is satisfied. It was argued that there had been
very few differences with the “redelijkheidstoets” (equity test) that Art.
6:100 BW originally presees, anyway. The HR, furthermore, sees no
difference in the distribution of the burden of proof.84 Both times it is
possible that the burden of proof for pass-on ultimately rests upon the
defendant. This is clearly the case with a view to Art. 6:100 BW but it
might also be the result of pass-on being handled via Art. 6:95-97 BW
in conjunction with Art. 6:98 BW.85 Traditionally there were higher
legal barriers for a passing-on defence via Art. 6:100 BW.86 There was
a higher likelihood that the causality would have been regarded as inter-
rupted because of an autonomous decision of the victim.87 In this way it
was less readily admitted that a benefit resulted from the same event.88
This is now overruled. In the light of the economics of pass-on set out
above, the view that pass-on is not a deliberate decision taken by a pur-
chaser but directly determined by the market conditions can be substan-
tiated. The new requirements to account for pass-on in Dutch
competition law (and beyond), hence, are that:89
82E-J Zippro, Privaatrechtelijke handhaving van mededingingsrecht (Alphen aan den Rijn 2009) 385.
83HR judgment of 8.7.2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:1483, para 4.4.1; the result is regarded according to W van
Boom, ‘Doorgeschoven kartelschade: schadeberekening of voordeelstoerekening?: Annotatie’ (2017)
Ars Aequi 41 on 42 as “verrassend eenvoudig” (surprisingly simple); surprised is also D Stein, ‘Doorbere-
kening van kartelschade: Annotatie bij HR 8 juli 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:1483 (TenneT/ABB)’ (2017) 8
NTBR 53, 56; not satisfied R Meijer and E-J Zippro, ‘“Elk nadeel heb z’n voordeel”: (bewijslast)problema-
tiek rondom het passingon verweer in kartelschadezaken’ [2016] Markt & Mededinging 220, 224; T Har-
tlief, ‘Voordeelstoerekening anno 2017’ [2017] Ars Aequi 473, 483: pragmatic and laconic.
84HR judgment of 8.7.2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:1483, Rn 4.4.4.
85See JA Möhlmann and MR Fidder, ‘TenneT/ABB: een mijlpaal voor kartelschade én het algemene scha-
devergoedingsrecht’ [2016] Maandblad voor Vermogensrecht 262; Meijer and Zippro (n 83) 222 and
Stein (n 83) 58.
86Keirse and van Kogelenberg (n 83) 102; Asser/Sieburgh 6-II 2017/99a, 100: “strenger” (stricter).
87Representative HR judgment of 10.7.2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BI3402, para 3.7; dazu T Hartlief, ‘Vos/TSN:
schade, voordeel en schadebeperkingsplicht’ [2010] WPNR 92.
88AJ Rijsterborgh, ‘“Een zelfde gebeurtenis” in art. 6:100 BW’ [2012] AV&S 59.
89Meijer and Zippro (n 83) 224; Jeroen S Kortmann and F Blaauboer, ‘Behandeling en bevoordeling door
kartelinbreuken: het doorberekeningsverweer na TenneT/ABB’ in EM Hoogervorst, C Jansen, M van de
Moosdijk and A Knigge (eds), Kartelschade (Nijmegen 2019) 101, 115.
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(1) tussen de normschending en de gestelde voordelen dient een condicio sine
qua nonverband te bestaan (het dient te gaan om een ‘voordeel’ dat zonder de
normschending niet zou zijn ontstaan); (there has to be a conditio sine qua
non-relationship between the infringement and the alleged benefit [it concerns
a benefit that would not have emerged but for the infringement])
and
(2) het dient met inachtneming van de in artikel 6:98 BW besloten maatstaf
redelijk te zijn dat die voordelen in rekening worden gebracht bij de vaststelling
van de te vergoeden schade. (according to the benchmark of Art. 6:98 BW the
subtraction of the benefit must be equitable with a view to assessing the damage
that needs to be compensated.)
The procedure in which the HR intervenes is one out of two proceedings
that TenneT is pursuing – against ABB and against Alstom. As it currently
stands in the TenneT/ABB case ABB would have to pay around € 23
million (excluding interests).90 The overcharge concerned a gas-insulated
switchgear installation that TenneT acquired. According to the judge
TenneT did not pass on the overcharge that negatively affected its assets
in one act but step by step into the fees for its purchasers (the distributors).
The court expresses some concerns about generally assuming that any
company would pass-on such costs and acknowledges that there is an
element of choice. However, this choice is determined by the question
which prices the company can ask without losing its competitiveness in
the market. Some markets allow for pass-on and others do not.91 The
court, hence, clearly shows its awareness of the importance of the
market conditions for pass-on. In the case at hand one cannot speak of
a free but rather of a regulated market, where the fees for electricity
(that are affected by the pass on) are decided by the state. Therefore, in
the case at hand one has to act upon the assumption that causation is
given which is why an equity test is in order.92 Note that the court does
see the causal link as such and then moves on to a normative judgment.
This reasoning stands in some contrast to the approach of the German
courts that are not at ease as regards pass-on in regulated markets. The
passing-on defence is not successful for the following reason according
to the Dutch court’s verdict: The final consumers at the end of the
chain that are actually going to suffer the damage are not going to sue –
in essence a comparable “rational apathy” argument to the one that
90Rechtbank Gelderland judgment of 29.3.2017, ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2017:1724.
91Rechtbank Gelderland judgment of 29.3.2017, ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2017:1724, paras 4.15.
92Rechtbank Gelderland judgment of 29.3.2017, ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2017:1724, paras 4.15.
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some of the German courts consider. Therefore, the court prefers that
TenneT keeps “all the compensation” as it is entirely owned by the
Dutch state which is why after all the money kind of goes back to the
final consumer.93 Appeal is currently pending. The court of appeal is
the Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden and it requests expert evidence in
an interim judgment.94 To that end it compiles a list of questions,
among others concerning pass-on.95 The question whether the defence
can be denied for equity reasons will come up again. There has de facto
been pass-on which the claimant does also not deny.96 All party reports
already include obviously differing numbers regarding the pass-
on rate.97 The second procedure TenneT/Alstom is equally not yet
final.98 As it currently stands Alstom is to pay € 14.1 million in compen-
sation (excluding interests). The court has pronounced itself in this pro-
cedure before the judgment of the HR was passed which is why the
passing-on defence was assessed according to Art. 6:100 BW and rejected
for equity reasons.99 In the court’s view Alstom did not sufficiently show
why subtracting the benefit would be equitable. Also this court considered
that TenneT’s customers would not initiate litigation themselves. It is
commented upon in the Dutch literature that this argument is legally irre-
levant even if in fact true.100 As said economic arguments can only be used
as a support if pass-on effectively occurred or not. The equity correction at
hand is still purely done on the basis of Art 6:100 BW and not the new
general standard of Art. 6:98 BW. The HR did, by the way, in its judge-
ment not pronounce itself about the question in how far pass-on may
be denied if the next purchaser level or the final purchaser level will not
sue. The volume effect was, furthermore, not pertinent which is why
there was (in essence)101 no mention of it. Apart from this element
there are, generally speaking, similarities between both variants of adjust-
ment of profits in Germany and the Netherlands in the sense that they are
both requiring a causal link between infringement and benefit and the
equity correction. The burden of proof regarding the pass-on lies with
93Rechtbank Gelderland judgment of 29.3.2017, ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2017:1724, parass 4.19.
94Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden judgment of 29.5.2018, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2018:4876, para 5.17.
95Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden judgment of 29.5.2018, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2018:4876, starting para 5.22.
96Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden judgment of 29.5.2018, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2018:4876, para 5.27.
97According to the claimants 52–56%; according to the defendants partly 70.1% and partly 87.5%.
98The current last word has Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden judgment of 28.8.2018, ECLI:NL:
GHARL:2018:7753.
99Rechtbank Gelderland judgment of 10.6.2015, ECLI:RBGEL:2015:3713.
100Drijber (n 80) 626.
101It is only once mentioned as a theoretical possibility in Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden judgment of
2.9.2014, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2014:6766, para 3.32.
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the defendant in both legal systems. The Dutch legal system like the
German one knows a judicial power to estimate damages (according to
Art. 6:97 BW).
3.2.2. Recent case-law
The Netherlands aims to consolidate all truck cartel litigation before the
Rechtbank Amsterdam on the basis of Art. 222 Rv.102 Therefore, there
are no judgements yet. It remains still possible that the whole procedure
will be transferred to the newly installed Netherlands Commercial
Court (NCC).103 This new court structure can be jointly selected by clai-
mant and defendant. Court language is English. Further requirements are
that there has to be an international element in the procedure and the
claims value has to be above € 25,000. Procedural costs are higher and
at least one Dutch lawyer has to be involved in the procedure on both
sides.
3.3. Spain
3.3.1. General approach
Spanish law also knows the principle of unjust enrichment.104 It tradition-
ally takes a positive stance towards accepting a passing-on defence.105 The
legal institution of compensatio lucri cum damno is also known in Spanish
law.106 It requires that the damaging event leads to both damage and a
benefit (“ventaja”).107 The causal link with the infringement is again
required. Scarcely a mention of an equity control can be found.108 The
102Rechtbank Amsterdam judgment of 15.5.2019, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2019:3574, para 3.38.
103Wet van 12 december 2018 tot wijziging van het Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering en de Wet
griffierechten burgerlijke zaken in verband met het mogelijk maken van Engelstalige rechtspraak bij de
internationale handelskamers van de rechtbank Amsterdam en het gerechtshof Amsterdam, Stb.m 2018,
474; with it also the Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal (NCCA) was introduced. The HR remains
the final authority.
104F Peña López, La responsabilidad civil por daños a la libre competencia: un análisis de las normas de
derecho sustantivo contenidas en el Título VI de la Ley de Defensa de la Competencia, mediante las que
se transpone la Directiva 2014/104/UE (2018) 158; GA Martín Martín, Competencia, enriquecimiento y
daños (2019) 148 distinguishes the principle of “enriquecimiento injusto” and the legal institution “enri-
quecimiento sin causa“ and shows how the courts do not always differentiate accurately. He is generally
very critical of the added value of the legal institution.
105Peña López (n 104) 239; about the strengths and weaknesses of the passing on defense: ibid 226.
106Velasco San Pedro, Luis Antonio and Carmen Herrero Suárez, ‘La "passing-on defence, ¿un falso dilema?’
in Velasco San Pedro, Luis Antonio, C Alonso Ledesma, M Echebarría Sáenz, C Herrero Suárez and J
Gutiérrez Gilsanz (eds), La aplicación privada del derecho de la competencia (2011) 593, 602.
107For the context of contract law see TS decision of 19.12.2018, ECLI: ES:TS:2018:13209A; further reading
Díez-Picazo y Ponce de León, Luis, Derecho de daños, Madrid 1999; Yzquierdo Tolsada, Responsabilidad
civil extracontractual, 2015.
108E Pastor Martínez, ‘Cartelista con esfera reflectante: sobre la passing-on defense’ [2019] Boletín
Mercantil 9.
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conditions for the legal institution are not so clear. It is, for instance, not so
evident if the damage that was passed on is counted as never having come
into existence in the first place or not – in other words the moment when
the subtraction happens is not so clearly defined.109 Neither it is exactly
clear if the causal link is established via a test of adequacy or not.
Overall Spanish courts only rarely refer to the legal institution and there
is no mention of it in the law.110 One recent contribution pronounces
itself against its existence in Spanish tort law altogether.111
The Spanish Supreme Court Tribunal Supremo (TS) has like the
German BGH and unlike the Dutch HR taken the opportunity to pro-
nounce itself in a competition law case about pass-on in relation to poss-
ible negative consequences it entails for the purchasers. Germany and
Spain as a consequence have developed similar mechanisms. The
Spanish sugar cartel case in essence followed – without referring to it –
the main rule established by the German ORWI-judgment.112 It was
much rather inspired by the case-law of the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) which, then again, was only referred to once in the ORWI-judg-
ment.113 The topic of pass-on emerges in European Union law for the
first time in 1979 in the Ireks-Arkady case (which is not a competition
law case).114 It then receives further attention in the ECJ case-law regard-
ing the entitlement to the repayment of charges levied by a MS contrary to
the rules of EU law.115 In essence a compensation payment of such a
charge would – if the recipient actually passed on this charge to the
next level – lead to an unjust enrichment. The European Commission
109One hint is given by Patricia Vidal Martínez and Agustín Capilla, ‘Título VI De la compensación de los
daños causados por las prácticas restrictivas de la competencia (artículos 71 a 81)’ in J Folguera, A Gutiér-
rez, J Massaguer and JM Sala Arquer (eds), In Comentario a la Ley de Defensa de la Competencia (5.ª ed.) y
a los preceptos sobre organización y procedimientos de la Ley de creación de la Comisión Nacional de los
Mercados y la Competencia (Cizur Menor (Navarra) 2017) Art. 76, 3 as he argues that the pass-on excludes
the damage; Martín Martín (n 104) 189 seems to prefer an early subtraction, too.
110ibid 178. Spanish authors often refer to foreign sources when it comes to discussing the legal
institution.
111Robles Martín-Laborda, Antonio: La inaplicabilidad de la defensa basada en la repercusión del daño
(passing-on) a los casos de los cárteles de sobres y camiones. In: Almacen de Derecho 9.3.2020.
112TS judgment of 7.11.2013, ECLI: ES:TS:2013:5819.
113BGH judgment of 28.6.2011, KZR 75/10, para 63 with further references.
114EuGH, 4.10.1979, Rs. 238/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:226 – Ireks-Arkady, para 14; see A. Schwietert, Der effet utile
und das Kartellzivilrecht. Die Vorgaben des Unionsrechts bei der Ausgestaltung der Zivilrechtsfolgen des Art.
101 AEUV (Baden-Baden, 2018), 140; Pass-on Study 2016, 21.
115Cp. the judgments EuGH 9.11.1983, Rs. 199/82, ECLI:EU:C:1983:318 – San Giorgio, paras 12; EuGH
14.1.1997, Joint cases C-192/95 bis C-218/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:12 – Comateb, paras 20; EuGH 27.2.1980,
Rs. 68/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:57 – Just, para 26; EuGH (Fifth chamber) 21.9.2000, Joint cases C-441/98
und C-442/98, Slg 2000, I-7145-7181 – Michailidis, para 34; EuGH (Fifth chamber) 2.10.2003, Rs. C-
147/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:172 – Weber’s wine world, paras 94; Bulst (n 7) 237 ff with further references;
G Meessen, Der Anspruch auf Schadensersatz bei Verstößen gegen EU-Kartellrecht (Tübingen 2011) 511.
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prefers to talk of the “defence of unjust enrichment”.116 According to the
ECJ’s case-law MS are free to go against such a pass-on but they are under
no obligation.117 The requirements of the defence are two: firstly the proof
of pass-on and secondly the proof that there were no negative conse-
quences attached to pass-on. Hence, the volume effect is recognized and
hinders in this sense the occurrence of an unjust enrichment partially
or totally.118 In the words of the European Commission pass-on and
the de facto resulting unjust enrichment are cumulative conditions in
order for a passing-on defence to be considered.119 The burden of proof
in that regard lies with the defendant – it may not be the claimant that
has to show that there was no such thing as pass-on.120 The scope of
the burden of proof includes the volume effect.121 This case-law can be
translated to the competition law context.122 Therefore, it is also true in
the competition law context that MS may go against such pass-on situ-
ations but they are before the Directive is passed under no obligation.123
The burden of proof rests upon the defendant.124 This proof includes
the non-existence of the volume effect.125 This case-law is the basis for
the Spanish judgement in which the passing-on defence is permitted in
the quest of avoiding unjust enrichment, most prominently in the case
“Azúcar II”.126 The Spanish like the German defendant was allotted the
burden of proof and had to show the non-existence of a volume
116Europäische Kommission, Arbeitspapier zum Grünbuch, 59.
117EuGH, 27.2.1980, Rs. 68/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:57 – Just, para 26; EuGH (Fifth chamber), 21.9.2000, Joint
cases C-441/98 und C-442/98, Slg 2000, I-7145-7181 – Michailidis, para 31.
118Representative EuGH, 27.2.1980, Rs. 68/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:57 – Just, para 26; EuGH 14.1.1997, Joint
cases Rechtssachen C-192/95 bis C-218/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:12 – Comateb, paras 31; M Ebers, Rechte,
Rechtsbehelfe und Sanktionen im Unionsprivatrecht (Tübingen 2016), 604; Bulst (n 7) 238; Meessen (n
115) 514.
119Europäische Kommission, Arbeitspapier zum Grünbuch, 59.
120EuGH (Fifth chamber) 2.10.2003, Rs. C-147/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:172 – Weber’s wine world, para 111;
Schlussanträge des Generalanwalts Slynn vom 29. September 1987 in den verbundenen Rechtssachen
331/85, 376/85 und 378/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:391 – Bianco und Girard, 1111; ibid 513; HP Logemann, Der
kartellrechtliche Schadensersatz. Die zivilrechtliche Haftung bei Verstößen gegen das deutsche und euro-
päische Kartellrecht nach Ergehen der VO (EG) Nr. 1/2003 und der 7. GWB-Novelle (Berlin 2009)116; K
Schürmann, Die Weitergabe des Kartellschadens (Baden-Baden 2011) 57 with further references.
121Pass-on Study 2016, 23; ibid 60.
122Bulst (n 8) 244; C Heinze, Schadensersatz im Unionsprivatrecht (2017) 161, 235; Meessen (n 115) 513;
Schürmann (n 120) 37; Europäische Kommission, Arbeitspapier zum Grünbuch, 57; M Strand, The
passing-on problem in damages and restitution under EU law (2017) 338; Logemann (n 120) 117; Roth
in: Jaeger/Kokott/Pohlmann/Schroeder, Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, 93. Lieferung
04.2019, § 33c GWB, para 12 with further references; Ebers (n 118) 604 with further references: unclear.
123EuGH 20.9.2001, Rs. C-453/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465 – Courage, para 30; EuGH (third chamber) 13.7.2006,
Joint cases C-295/04 bis C-298/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:461 – Manfredi, para 94, 99; Schürmann (n 120) 39;
Ebers (n 118) 603; Bulst (n 7) 240; Meessen (n 115) 512; Heinze (n 122) 235.
124Europäische Kommission, Arbeitspapier zum Weißbuch, 64; Europäische Kommission, Weißbuch
2008, 9.
125Schürmann (n 120) 60; Logemann (n 120) 118.
126TS judgment of 7.11.2013, ECLI: ES:TS:2013:5819.
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effect.127 This was argued to be in line with the European requirements
and also with Article 217 LEC (Ley Enjuiciamiento Civil – Spanish Civil
Procedural Code) – the relevant provision for the allocation of the
burden of proof.128 Proving a partial pass-on was likewise regarded as
possible.129 An equivalent to the German “sekundäre Darlegungslast” –
the obligation imposed upon the purchasers to cooperate when it comes
to disclosing evidence under very narrow circumstances is not evident.
In the case at hand the passing-on defence was not granted and the defen-
dant had to pay the full amount of compensation – € 4.1 million – plus
interests. The TS carried out an economic analysis. It called the vision
to only look at the price increase on the after market simplified.130 The
assessment has to deal with the question of whether the economic
damage (“el perjuicio económico, el daño”) resulting from the overcharge
was passed on.131 Seen like this the price increase set by the purchaser is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition. It has to be assessed on top if any
harm remained for the purchaser as can be the case if a volume effect
emerges due to pass-on. The defendant carries the burden of showing
that there was no such thing as a volume effect.132 If a volume effect is
shown the defensa “passing-on” cannot be granted or at least not in its
entirety. It is more generally argued in the literature that pass-on is pre-
dictable from the cartelists’ point of view which is why the condition of
adequate causation is fulfilled.133 Hence, prior to the implementation of
the Directive similarly to the situation in Germany in the event of
proving pass-on the case-law gave an advantage to the claimant by reliev-
ing him or her of the necessity to prove the volume effect. Again no such
case has ever occurred. The Spanish TS does not elaborate much on the
market conditions, whereas the German BGH does.
127P Hitchings, MA Malo and L Loras, ‘Considerations concerning the implementation of the EU compe-
tition law damages directive in Spain’ [2015] Concurrences - Revue des droits de la concurrence 25, 27;
Pedro-José Vela Torres, ‘Experiencia de la sala primera del tribunal supremo en aplicación privada de
la competencia’ in JI Ruiz Peris (ed), La compensación de los daños por infracción de las normas de com-
petencia tras la directiva 2014/104/UE. Directiva y propuesta de transposición (2016) 53, 71.
128TS judgment of 7.11.2013, ECLI: ES:TS:2013:5819, F.D. para 5.1.
129F Marcos, ‘Damages Claims in the Spanish Sugar Cartel’ (2015) 3 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 205,
224.
130TS judgment of 7.11.2013, ECLI: ES:TS:2013:5819, F.D. para 5.3; E Sanjuán y Muñoz, Valoraciòn de daños
en los supuestos antitrust (2017) 145; Peña López (n 104) 248.
131The terms “sobrecoste” and “daño” are no synonyms, vgl. Purificación Martorell Zulueta, ‘La cuantifica-
ción del daño desde la perspectiva de un experto’ in JI Ruiz Peris (ed), Derecho Europeo de compensación
de los daños causados por los cárteles y por los abusos de posición de dominio de acuerdo con la Directiva
2014/104/UE: proyecto europeo “Training of National Judges in EU Competition Law (2018) 157, 170.
132Hitchings, Malo, and Loras (n 127) 27; Vela Torres (n 127) 71.
133Peña López (n 104) 231.
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3.3.2. Recent case-law
The Spanish lower courts have been rather active with a view to litigation
in the context of the truck cartel, denying the passing-on defense through-
out. Pass-on finds the first mentioning in a judgment from Zaragoza.134
The defensa is quickly denied. The judge notices and questions, by the
way, the strategy that the defendant on the one hand denies the existence
of any overcharge but on the other hand brings the defensa “passing-on”.
In a next judgment in Valencia the defensa “passing-on” is again denied as
it was not appropriately argued.135 The consecutive judgment from Valen-
cia that is referred to in many of the ensuing judgments is crucial for the
latest developments in Spanish case-law.136 The presiding judge takes the
opportunity to distinguish two pass-on situations when assessing a dis-
closure request:137 In his view there is on the one hand the classical situ-
ation in which a cartelized product is sold on. Such a situation merits
disclosure as pass-on is a realistic option. However, for the other situation
where the claimant uses the cartelized trucks to carry out transportation
services, an own commercial activity, this is not the case. In this second
situation the judge regards the claimant as a final consumer with no pos-
sibilities of pass-on.138 There was, hence, no causality that stretched to the
prices that the customers paid for the transportation of their goods. To
motivate his decision, the judge refers to two German proceedings.139
There are in the judge’s view two different markets without a close link
– the market on which the truck selling cartelists act and the market for
transportation services. Therefore, any potential actions taken by the clai-
mant on this separate market are beyond the scope of the defensa “passing
on”.140 If you wish, the judge makes a differentiation between a market
that has a vertical and one that has a horizontal link with the market on
which the cartel operates. The defendants had alleged that pass-
on had occurred. Indeed, the similarity with the judgment by LG Dort-
mund is obvious. The two judges even take the same consequence in
134Juzgado de lo Mercantil N°. 1 de Zaragoza judgment of 13.12.2018, ECLI: ES:JMZ:2018:4752, F.D. para 3.
135Juzgado de lo Mercantil N°. 3 de Valencia judgment of 20.2.2019, ECLI: ES:JMV:2019:34, F.D. para 8.99.
136Juzgado de lo Mercantil N°. 3 de Valencia judgment of 13.3.2019, ECLI: ES:JMV:2019:187, later Juzgado
de lo Mercantil N°. 3 de Valencia judgment of 7.5.2019, ECLI: ES:JMV:2019:222, F.D. paras 8.98; Juzgado
de lo Mercantil N°. 3 de Valencia judgment of 15.5.2019, ECLI: ES:JMV:2019:510, F.D. para 8.92; Juzgado
de lo Mercantil N°. 3 de Valencia judgment of 13.9.2019, ECLI: ES:JMV:2019:1002, F.D. paras 7.83.
137Juzgado de lo Mercantil N°. 3 de Valencia decision of 17.12.2018, ECLI: ES:JMV:2018:147A.
138Juzgado de lo Mercantil N°. 3 de Valencia decision of 17.12.2018, ECLI: ES:JMV:2018:147A, F.D. para 17.
139Juzgado de lo Mercantil N°. 3 de Valencia decision of 17.12.2018, ECLI: ES:JMV:2018:147A, F.D. para 18
makes reference to LG Dortmund judgment of 27.6.2018–8 O 13/17, BeckRS 2018, 13951 and LG Hann-
over judgment of 18.12.2017 - 18 O 8/17, WuW 2018, 101 – both have been referred to above – where it
was found that the markets were not identical (“no pueda apreciarse esa identidad de mercados”).
140Juzgado de lo Mercantil N°. 3 de Valencia decision of 17.12.2018, ECLI: ES:JMV:2018:147A, F.D. para 22.
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terms of denying a related disclosure request because of ruling out pass-on
in certain circumstances. Whereas the LG Dortmund refers back to ORWI
to underpin its reasoning, the Spanish judge quotes the Directive – more
precisely Art. 12. The Spanish judge is criticized for discussing this ques-
tion of legal causality under the wrong heading.141 From a legal point of
view such a pass-on action could be regarded as not foreseeable for the
cartelists and therefore fail the test of legal causation. One can immedi-
ately remark that this argument is doubtful from an economic point of
view given that the cartelists fix their price in anticipation of profit max-
imizing behaviour along the whole supply chain. The judge acknowledges
that from an economic point of view damage can be passed on “ad
infinitum”.142 The Spanish judge rather confidently underlines the pre-
cedence that the legal perspective takes over the economic one.143 This
does not seem to be the ideal interplay. Rather, with the help of economics
the actual causality can be ascertained, whereas there may be additional
legal arguments for disregarding this evidence for specific cases in the
context of the limitations possible when checking for legal causality.
The Spanish judge also, even if not very concretely, refers to the ORWI
and TenneT judgments, same as the English case Sansbury’s.144 He does
not regard the value of economics as absolute.145
3.4. Changes brought about by the cartel damages directive
With the Directive the consideration of the passing-on defence becomes a
“must” for the MS. The European requirements are to prevail over the pre-
existing national solutions. The defendant, when faced with a damage
claim for the overcharge, may invoke the so-called passing-on defence
(Art. 13), showing that the claimant has reduced his or her damage by
passing it on to the next level of the supply chain to reduce the amount
of compensation he needs to pay. The burden of proof regarding the
pass-on according to the Directive rests very clearly with the defendant.
There are no presumptions available to his benefit. However, the court’s
141A Robles Martín-Laborda, ‘El alcance de la repercusión del daño (passing-on) derivado de infracciones
del Derecho de la Competencia’ (2019) Almacen de Derecho.
142Juzgado de lo Mercantil N°. 3 de Valencia judgment of 7.5.2019, ECLI: ES:JMV:2019:222, F.D. para 119;
there is no established test frame, see Pastor Martínez (n 108) 2.
143Juzgado de lo Mercantil N°. 3 de Valencia judgment of 7.5.2019, ECLI: ES:JMV:2019:222, F.D. para 8.108;
see also Juzgado de lo Mercantil N°. 3 de Valencia judgment of 30.12.2019, ECLI: ES:JMV:2019:1265,
F. D. para 67.ii.
144Sainsbury’s Supermarket Vs. Master Card 14.7.2016, 1241/5/7/15 (T).
145Pastor Martínez (n 108) 11; Juzgado de lo Mercantil N°. 3 de Valencia judgment of 30.12.2019, ECLI: ES:
JMV:2019:1265, F. D. para 67.iii regrading weaknesses of the economic method.
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powers to estimate must apply as usual (see Art. 12 [5]). The defendant
can use the passing-on defence against any purchaser (except for the
final consumer).146 In case of a partial pass-on, the remaining amount
needs to be compensated.147 With the implementation of the Directive
MS differently to before are required to introduce a passing-on defence
that fulfils the minimum criteria of the Directive into their national
laws. This leaves them overall with a limited amount of flexibility.
When it comes to the volume effect the Directive stipulates it as a comple-
tely separate action and regulates it only very superficially. It merely states
that the provisions set out regarding pass-on are without prejudice to
claiming lost profit.148 More concretely, Art. 12 (3) reads:
This Chapter shall be without prejudice to the right of an injured party to claim
and obtain compensation for loss of profits due to a full or partial passing-on of
the overcharge.149
This constitutes a change compared to the previous ECJ jurisprudence on
matters of pass-on.150 The formulations in the Directive in this context
seem to favour the defendant far more.151 Art. 13 makes clear that pass-
on is only concerned with the fate of the price overcharge.152 An emerging
volume effect can thus not exclude the passing-on defence.153 This new
regime prevails over the pre-existing national regimes.154 This requires
in particular that the volume effect is considered separately.155 Note
that the first proposal for a Directive also considered pass-on (in its Art.
12 [1]), however, in Art. 12 (2) it was furthermore restricted because:
“Insofar as the overcharge has been passed on to persons at the next
level of the supply chain for whom it is legally impossible to claim com-
pensation for their harm, the defendant shall not be able to invoke the
defence referred to in the preceding paragraph”. The fact that this restric-
tion is omitted in the final formulation supports the conclusion that it is
rather doubtful if the final Directive leaves scope for such value
146Pass-on Study 2016, 4.
147D Ashton (ed), Competition Damages Actions in the EU. Law and Practice (2nd edn 2018) 53.
148See Art. 12 (3).
149With “this Chapter” it is referred to Chapter IV – “The Passing-on of overcharges”.
150It was not pronounced specifically for competition law but the findings of case-law in other legal fields
could be translated. See above at 3.3.
151Franck (n 50) 575.
152Heinze (n 122) 237; Inderst and Thomas (n 9) 355, 364f.
153Heinze (n 122) 237, 617; C Kersting and N Preuß, ‘Umsetzung der Kartellschadensersatzrichtlinie (2014/
104/EU): Ein Gesetzgebungsvorschlag aus der Wissenschaft’, 48.
154Heinze (n 122) 235 regarding the German “Vorteilsausgleichung”.
155H Schweitzer, ‘Die neue Richtlinie für wettbewerbsrechtliche Schadensersatzklagen’ [2014] NZKart 335,
338; Franck (n 50) 575.
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judgments.156 However, the Directive leaves it in the hands of the MS how
causation is established.157 In that regard, if we think of the potential of the
criterion of legal causation – requirements of, for instance, adequacy or
equity – to restrict the possibilities of finding a causal link some normative
adaptation might remain possible.
As a side-remark: Another change that the Directive brings about is the
explicit introduction of a (rebuttable) presumption of pass-on to the
benefit of the indirect purchaser (cp Art. 14 [2]). It concerns the
damage component as such and not its quantity.158 Suffice it to say here
that the introduction of such a presumption to the benefit of the indirect
purchaser but not (about the same damage component!) to the benefit of
the cartelist, is weak from an economic point of view. It appears, hence,
likely, that judges in the future may consider the pass-on presumption
indirectly also when assessing a cartelists’ passing-on defense.
Regarding the value judgments that courts in various MS have taken in
the context of the passing-on defence these options seem more limited
after implementation of the Directive. Some German scholars argue that
a reasoning about the passivity of the next levels in the supply chain
forbids itself after the Directive.159 As alluded to the Directive, however,
leaves a certain scope for additional requirements for causation.160 There-
fore, I would argue that a certain freedom is still given even after the
implementation. This freedom is restricted by the principles of effective-
ness and equivalence. In particular in the light of the principle of effective-
ness one might be able to argue that having the wrongdoer escape liability
is the least desirable of outcomes when the goals of full compensation and
full liability are traded off. It might indeed be preferable to solve trade-offs
in favour of the victims rather than the tortfeasors.161 Generally speaking
predictable criteria would be desirable. What is true for Germany, is also
156H-PH Hanson and J Holzwarth, ‘Discovering New Spheres of Antitrust Damages Quantification: The
European Commission, National Courts, and Guidelines on Passing-on’ [2019] CPI Antitrust Chronicle
February 1, 6.
157Recital 11; this was also recently reaffirmed by EuGH (Fifth Chamber) 12.12.2019, Rs. C-435/18, ECLI:EU:
C:2019:1069 – Otis u.a./Land Österreich.
158The three conditions necessary as a basis for the presumption to kick in (infringement of competition
law, overcharge for direct purchaser and proof that the indirect purchaser bought from the [affected]
direct purchaser) do not contain economic arguments.
159A. Fritzsche, ‘Schadensabwälzung – Auslegungsfragen zum Kartellzivilrecht nach der 9. GWB-Novelle’
(2017) NZKart 630, 635; Roth in: Jaeger/Kokott/Pohlmann/Schroeder, Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kar-
tellrecht, 93. Lieferung 04.2019, § 33c GWB, para 27; Inderst and Thomas (n 9) 366.
160So auch Roth in: Jaeger/Kokott/Pohlmann/Schroeder, Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, 93. Lie-
ferung 04.2019, § 33c GWB, para 38.
161Likewise A Petrasincu, ‘Kartellschadensersatz nach dem Referentenentwurf der 9. GWB-Novelle’ [2016]
WuW 330, 331f; Christian Kersting, ‘Kartellschadensersatz: Haftungstatbestand - Bindungswirkung -
Schadensabwälzung’ in C Kersting and R Podszun (eds), Die 9. GWB-Novelle (2017) 115, 152; LG Kiel judg-
ment of 18.4.2019 − 6 O 108/18, NZKart 2019, 435.
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true for the Netherlands and Spain. The European legislation seems to
increase the convergence of the MS jurisprudence. When it comes to dis-
regarding economic arguments by way of a legal reasoning the Directive as
such does not give the MS any guidance in how far economic reasonings
for causation in fact are to be weighed against normative arguments for
legal causation. However, the Commission seeks to train the European
judges in economics with the additional guidance it passed. Some
conflicts with the Directive are, furthermore, seen between the ORWI-
and “Azúcar II”-judgments with a view to allocating the burden of
proof that there was no such thing as a volume effect to the defendant
side.162 The volume effect is, however, not the main concern of this paper.
4. Conclusion
Damages in competition are treated as a category of special torts which is
why to start with the general tort law system of the MS as enhanced and
overridden by the European requirements re pass-on are applicable in
cartel cases. The case-law decided according to old law shows that pass-
on is almost categorically denied for a number of reasons that are doubtful
from an economic point of view. The Directive introduces some specific
requirements. However, it does give some leeway to the MS, too. Ques-
tions that the Directive does not solve, like causation, are solved in the tra-
ditional tort and procedural law. Many current challenges and potential
solutions in cartel cases boil down to the question of causation in the
broad sense.163 More than with more “ordinary” torts, however, factual
causation for the different damage components of an antitrust violation
can be explained by economics – in fact can only be explained by econ-
omics. It is this intuition that leads to the necessity of trading off economic
insights on causation with legal considerations. Whereas it seems prefer-
able to take a normative value judgment only after the factual economic
basis has been established, it is also true that economic proof is costly
and an investment in economic evidence whose result will later be disre-
garded for legal reasons can be considered a societal waste. Furthermore,
economic evidence is far from perfect, the result may vary with the data
available and the quantification method chosen, and is in that sense
162Kersting and Preuß (n 153) 48; T Makatsch and AS Mir, ‘Die neue EU-Richtlinie zu Kartellschadenser-
satzklagen – Angst vor der eigenen “Courage”?’ [2015] EuZW 7, 12; Schweitzer (n 155) 337; Heinze (n
122) 219; Peña López (n 104) 248.
163This contribution is focused on the question of causation as regards the existence of pass-on as such – it
is less concerned with the subsequent and interlinked challenge of actual damage quantification.
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often not capable to establish causation beyond any doubt. The array of
cases shows how different courts are currently struggling with this
trade-off. Clearly, judges are also limited by their naturally missing econ-
omic expertise. It, therefore, seems paramount to continue fostering a
joint approach between law and economics of causation that allows
improving the understanding of market dynamics, to determine the
sufficient degree of proof for different types of damage, to develop a
legal causation test inspired by economics and a resource-saving approach
that not least leads to predictability for the litigants.
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